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THE KNOCK-DOWN, DRAG-OUT BATTLE OVER
GOVERNMENT REGULATION OF TELEVISION
VIOLENCE
Terry L. Etter'
One night during the "Weekend Update" segment
of "Saturday Night Live," Gilda Radner, as the
well-meaning but somewhat misguided commentator
"Emily Litella," lashed out against those opposing
"violins on television." After a few minutes of her
tirade on the beauty of violin music and how it adds
to society, "anchorman" Chevy Chase interrupted to
explain that the subject was "violence on television"
not "violins." She paused and looked sheepishly into
the camera, "never mind."
Various governmental bodies have considered reg-
ulating violence on television for nearly forty years.
Like Emily Litella, most are well-meaning, but
somewhat misguided. Their efforts seem to be fo-
cused on the most visible aspect of the violence prob-
lem rather than the core issues, such as poverty,
drugs, and inadequate supervision of children.
The catalyst for the most recent movement came
in the late 1980s, when Senator Paul Simon of Illi-
nois turned on the television set in a hotel room and
unintentionally viewed a portion of "The Texas
Chain Saw Massacre."' Aghast at the carnage he
saw on the screen, Senator Simon began a push to-
ward regulating violence on television. Various anti-
violence bills have since been introduced in Congress
1 Mr. Etter is a Staff Attorney with the National Associa-
tion of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C. The views expressed are
those of the author and not necessarily those of his employer.
' See Steven W. Colford, TV Ads to Get Violence Exam,
ADVERTISING AGE, July 4, 1994, at 40.
' See H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993); S. 1811,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
' Role of Telecommunications in Hate Crimes, 58 Fed. Reg.
16,340 (1993).
' See City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,
Inc., 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (holding that cable operators' First
Amendment rights are greater than those of broadcasters, be-
cause cable operators do not use radio frequencies). Writing for
the Court, Justice Rehnquist alluded to the First Amendment
rights of the various media:
Cable television partakes of some of the aspects of speech
and the communication of ideas, as do the traditional en-
resulting in several hearings on the matter. At least
two members of Congress have proposed requiring
television set manufacturers to install a circuit that
potentially could block out all violent programming.8
The anti-violence crusade has since spread to
other federal governmental bodies. For example, the
National Telecommunications and Information Ad-
ministration ("NTIA") has begun an inquiry into
"the role of telecommunications in crimes of hate
and violent acts against ethnic, religious, and racial
minorities."'
Government regulation of the violence portrayed
on television is a tricky business, to say the least.
The federal government would be making decisions
as to the amount and types of violent acts that could
be broadcast on television, as well as the time of day
such acts could be aired. Another challenge facing
the government is the constitutional double-standard
involving the First Amendment rights of broadcasters
and cable operators. Regulation may violate the
rights of cable programmers, whose speech has been
granted broader constitutional protection than that of
broadcasters.5 Infringing on the rights of cable pro-
grammers may destroy the effectiveness of violence
regulation, thus raising other legal challenges to the
terprises of newspaper and book publishers, public speak-
ers and pamphleteers. Respondent's proposed activities
would seem to implicate First Amendment interests as do
the activities of wireless broadcasters, which were found to
fall within the ambit of the First Amendment in Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, even though the free speech as-
pects of the wireless broadcasters' claim were found to be
outweighed by the Government interests in regulating by
reason of the scarcity of available frequencies.
Id. at 494-95 (citation omitted). Thus, because their transmis-
sion mode does not use radio frequencies, cable operators have
an elevated First Amendment status as compared to broadcast-
ers. However, the Court of Appeals, in the remand proceedings,
noted that cable operators' rights are not as predominant as
those of newspapers. See Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City
of Los Angeles, 13 F.3d 1327, 1332 (9th Cir. 1994).
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regulation of broadcast violence.
This Article explores the prospect of, and the legal
issues involved in, the regulation of television vio-
lence. Part I examines the background of the issue
and how the government has traditionally dealt with
television violence, as well as recent congressional
proposals concerning violent programming. Part II
analyzes the difficulties in defining and regulating
television violence in a manner that will withstand
constitutional scrutiny. Part III identifies the First
Amendment implications of regulation. Finally, Part
IV focuses on the need to reconcile violence regula-
tion as it applies to cable systems. This Article con-
cludes that government regulation thus far proposed
would infringe upon First Amendment rights of
broadcasters and on adult viewers. This Article pro-
poses that self-regulation is the most restrictive
means by which to alleviate the problem.
I. THE "NEED" FOR REGULATION
A. Lack of a Causal Link Between Violent Pro-
gramming and Violent Behavior
The changing American lifestyle has been accom-
panied by a new set of problems. Among them is the
evolution of the American family. Once, nearly every
American household had two parents. Increasingly,
however, two-parent households find both parents
working away from home, and more households
have only one parent. As a result, children generally
spend more time without parental supervision. At
the same time, the youth crime rate has more than
tripled. In 1965, there were 137 violent crime arrests
per 100,000 youths. By 1990, the rate had risen to
430.6 violent crime arrests per 100,000 youths.6
Although most studies conducted on television vio-
lence link television viewing to a desensitization to-
' See Dennis D. Embry, Studies Link TV, Violence, USA
TODAY, July 9, 1993, at A10.
' See Schlegel, The Television Violence Act of 1990: A New
Program for Government Censorship?, 46 FED. CoM. L.J. 187
(1993). In addition, Congress has been unable to find positive
proof that television violence leads to real life violence. See H.
REP. No. 123, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). The House Judici-
ary Committee report noted that "Itihe bulk of scientific research
into this area seems to indicate that there is some link between
television violence and real life aggression. Though there is no
universal acceptance of this conclusion - a minority of studies
have reached the opposite conclusion." Id. at 3. The Committee
also cited a 1985 study on television violence conducted by Dr.
George Gerbner, which focuses more on the effect television vio-
lence has on victims of crime and less on the causal connection
between television violence and aggressive behavior. "While the
convergence of research indicates that exposure to violence does
ward violence, there is little direct evidence that
viewing violence on television is a "root" cause of vi-
olent behavior." Without such a correlation, legisla-
tion singling out television violence would be Consti-
tutionally suspect, since the government's interest in
regulating such programming would be weakened.
Most studies, instead, merely document the number
of violent acts contained in programming and the
context or manner in which violence is portrayed.'
For example, an annual violence profile conducted
by Dr. George Gerbner merely summarizes the
quantity of violence in a program, using a five-part
formula: (1) the percentage of programs containing a
violent occurrence; (2) twice the number of violent
episodes per program; (3) twice the number of vio-
lent episodes per hour; (4) the percentage of leading
characters involved in violent acts, either as perpe-
trators or victims; and (5) the percentage of leading
characters involved in killing, either as perpetrators
or victims.' Gerbner's studies make no correlation
between violent acts on television and violence in
society.
In fact, the only study definitively lining televi-
sion viewing to an increase in violent behavior did
not single out violent programming as the root of the
problem.10 Apparently, substantial viewing of any
television programming, violent or otherwise, in-
creases the tendency toward violent behavior, be-
cause television viewing replaces essential child de-
velopmental experiences, such as play and
socialization.1  A child who watches nothing but
"Nightmare on Elm Street" may have no more pro-
pensity toward violence than one who spends the
same amount of time viewing "Barney." Thus, the
fact that aggressive behavior may be caused by tele-
vision viewing in general, weakens the government's
argument that regulation specifically targeted at vio-
lent programming is furthering a government inter-
occasionally incite and often desensitize [sic], our findings show
that, for most viewers, television's mean and dangerous world
tends to cultivate a sense of relative danger, mistrust, depen-
dence, and - despite its supposedly 'entertaining nature' -
alienation and gloom." H. REP. No. 101-123 at 5 (citing Televi-
sion's Mean World: Violence Profile No. 14-15, at 10 (Sept.
1986)).
' See id.
9 See Prettyman and Hook, The Control of Media-Related
Imitative Violence, 38 FED. COM. L.J. 317, 323 n.17 (1987).
10 See Schlegel, supra note 7, at 200. A study, conducted by
Dr. Brandon Canterwell, a Washington psychiatrist and epide-
miologist, found that the mere introduction of television caused a
doubling of violent crimes as the first children to watch television




est. However, since most studies do show an increase
in the amount of violent acts broadcast over the air-
waves, television has become the most viable target
for reform.
B. Historical Background on Efforts to Control
Violence on Television
Congress first examined the issue of television vio-
lence as early as 1954, and addressed the matter at
least six times during the following twenty-three
years.' 2 In 1969 the National Commission on the
Causes and Prevention of Violence reported that "a
constant diet of violent behavior on television has an
adverse effect on human character and attitudes." "s
In response to this finding, the Senate Subcommittee
on Communications asked the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare to study the "effect
of entertainment television on children's behavior.'
4
The study conducted by the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare, as well as other
studies conducted from 1972 to 1974, provided sup-
port for the view that over-exposure to television vio-
lence adversely effects society in general, and chil-
dren in particular.'3 In response to the aroused
concerns, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC" or "Commission") initiated meetings with
top executives from NBC, ABC and CBS to en-
courage them to propose and adopt their own poli-
12 See, e.g., SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMMUNICATIONS OF THE
HOUSE COMM, ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE,
95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REPORT OF VIOLENCE ON TELEVISION
(Comm. Print 1977); Hearings on Violence on Television Before
the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974); Hearings in Review of
Policy Matters of Federal Communication and Inquiry into
Crime and Violence on Television and a Proposed ,Study
Thereof by the Surgeon General Before the Subcomm. on Com-
munications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess. (1969); Hearings for the Investigation of Juvenile Delin-
quency in the United States Before the Subcomm. to Investigate
Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 87th
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. (1961-62); Hearings for the Investigation
of Juvenile Delinquency in the United States Before the Sub-
comm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Judici-
ary Comm., 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); Hearings for the In-
vestigation of Juvenile Delinquency in the United States Before
the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate
Judiciary Comm., 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954).
" Report on the Broadcast of Violent, Indecent and Obscene
Material, 51 F.C.C.2d 418 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 FCC
Report].
14 Id. at 418.
15 See id.
16 See id. at 419.
'7 See Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. FCC, 423 F.
cies curbing the amount of violence on television."
Subsequently, in 1975, the networks and the Na-
tional Association of Broadcasters ("NAB") adopted
the "Family Viewing Policy." Under this policy,
programs broadcast during the hours of 7 p.m. and 9
p.m. were appropriate for viewing by the whole
family unless the network aired a warning advising
parents that the program was unsuitable for chil-
dren. Less than two years later, the "Family View-
ing Policy" was found to be unconstitutional and un-
enforceable due to antitrust violations.17
The issue of televised violence lay relatively dor-
mant thereafter until 1988, when the House held
hearings on the matter. 8 During these hearings,
Senator Paul Simon expressed the concerns of televi-
sion executives, who feared that a coordinated effort
within the industry to reduce violence might violate
antitrust laws. The first real law dealing with televi-
sion violence was the Television Program Improve-
ment Act of 1990 ("1990 Act"). 9 This Act provided
a three-year antitrust exemption for broadcasters,
cable operators, and programmers so that they could
develop and disseminate voluntary guidelines for re-
ducing the "negative impact of violence in telecast
material."20 The antitrust exemption was deemed
necessary in order to prevent a reoccurrence of the
litigation that resulted in the elimination of the
"Family Viewing Policy."'" The exemption expired
on November 30, 1993,2 however, with no agree-
Supp. 1064 (C.D. Cal. 1976), vacated and remanded sub. nom.,
Writers Guild of America, West, Inc. v. ABC, 609 F.2d 355
(9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 824 (1980). The FCC
reviewed the case on remand and found no First Amendment or
Administrative Procedure Act violation. In re Matter of Primary
Jurisdiction Referral of Claims Against Government Defendant
Arising From the Inclusion in the NAB Television Code of the
Family Viewing Policy, 95 F.C.C.2d 700 (1983). By then, how-
ever, the Justice Department had launched an attack on the
commercial aspects of the NAB Code, particularly those that
limited the number of products that could be advertised in a sin-
gle commercial. In United States v. NAB, 553 F. Supp. 621
(D.D.C. 1982), the advertising restriction was held to be in vio-
lation of the antitrust laws. Seven days following this decision,
the NAB canceled the Code's advertising provisions.
is Television Violence Act of 1988: Hearings on H.R. 3848
Before the Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1988).
' Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 Stat. 5127 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 303(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
20 47 U.S.C. § 303c(c).
21 See supra note 17.
22 See 47 U.S.C. § 303c(d)(providing that the exemption
only applies to agreements made during the three year period
beginning Dec. 1, 1990).
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ment and, in fact, little discussion within the
industry.
C. Congressional Response
Largely due to the lack of activity under the 1990
Act, and the public perception of television's effect
on violence,"' the 103d Congress saw a flurry of leg-
islative proposals addressing violence on television.
No fewer than ten bills and two resolutions concern-
ing the issue were introduced. One proposal, Senate
Bill 1383, would create a "safe harbor" by prohibit-
ing the production or distribution of violent pro-
grams to the public during hours when children are
reasonably likely to be a substantial portion of the
audience.2 Because there is no clear message as to
whom would be covered by the legislation, this bill
seemingly could be applicable not only to broadcast-
ers and cable operators, but also to satellite distribu-
tors and other programmers who distribute their
wares by FCC-regulated transmission systems. The
Bill specifically exempts premium and pay-per-view
cable programming, as well as documentaries, educa-
tional programs, and sporting events, which do not
contain the "negative influences of violent video
programming.""
Two fairly similar proposals require the FCC to
conduct a rulemaking to establish violence standards
for all programming, with the possible exception of
news, sports, documentaries and educational pro-
gramming. The House version, House Bill 2837,26
merely requires the FCC to establish standards by
which broadcasters and cable operators would air
less violent programming. Senate Bill 943,27 how-
ever, requires broadcasters to air warnings before
and during programs that "may contain violence, or
unsafe gun practices, and may adversely affect the
mental or physical health, or both, of a
child . ,,. s Criminal penalties could be imposed
on the broadcaster, the cable operator, or the
,3 For example, nearly 80% of people surveyed in a Decem-
ber 1993 Los Angeles Times poll saw a direct link between tele-
vision violence and real life violence. See Browning, Push-Button
Violence, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Feb. 26, 1994, at 458.
24 S. 1383, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
11 Id. at 2-3.
26 H.R. 2837, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
" S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
28 Id. at 4. The term "unsafe gun practices" is not defined,
and therefore would be left to the discretion of the Commission.
29 Id?
10 See Zamora v. CBS, 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla.
1979)(rejecting a mandatory duty of care on broadcasters for air-
ing violent programming).
programmer "if the events portrayed in the pro-
gramming occur in real life."29 Thus, the legislation
would place a duty of care on the media, which the
courts have refused to recognize. 80 -
Senate Bill 9731 and House Bill 215982 would re-
quire the FCC to issue 'report cards that rate pro-
grams for violent content and publish quarterly re-
ports of its findings. The Commission would not
only evaluate and rate television programs as to the
extent of the violent content, but also would rate ad-
vertisers as to their sponsorship of programs contain-
ing a high degree of violence. The two proposals as-
sert that the ratings would be used to empower
parents and the community to make programming
decisions themselves."
House Bill 2756 would require the FCC to'estab-
lish a toll-free number by which the public could
voice complaints about violent programming."' The
Commission would compile the information and pass
along to each station any complaints, suggestions, or
comments made about its programming. In addition,
the FCC would publish a quarterly summary in the
Federal Register, listing the complaints and identify-
ing the fifty programs receiving the most complaints,
along with the production company and principle
advertisers of the program." Moreover, the Com-
mission would report annually to Congress, evaluat-
ing whether, consistent with its public interest obli-
gations, the broadcasting industry responded to the
complaints. 6
House Bill 2888'7 and Senate Bill 181188 address
the violence issue from the technical side by requir-
ing that all television sets manufactured in or im-
ported into the United States be capable of blocking
violent programming. Programs would be coded with
electronic signals based on a standardized violence
rating system. Devices within the sets would read the
coded signals and block any programming the viewer
believes to be violent.
None of these proposals have progressed through
31 S. 973, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
32 H.R. 2159, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
8 There is no indication as to how the dissemination of the
rating of advertisers' program sponsorship would help families
and communities decide which. programs to watch. Obviously,
the purpose is to apply pressure on the advertisers who sponsor
programs deemed to be the most violent.
8, H.R. 2756, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
35 Id. at 3-4.
"' Id. at 5. No such evaluation is required for the cable in-
dustry because, unlike broadcasters, cable system operators and
programmers are not required to program in the public interest.
87 H.R. 2888, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
" S. 1811, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
[Vol. 3
TELEVISION VIOLENCE REGULATION
Congress, although at the time this Article was pub-
lished, the "safe harbor" bill (S. 1383) and the "vio-
lence report card" measure (S. 973) were being
championed for inclusion in the authorization legis-
lation for the NTIA.39 If no action is taken, these
and other ideas likely will resurface during the
104th Congress.'
II. THE DIFFICULTY IN DEFINING
VIOLENCE
One of the major problems in government regula-
tion of violence is in the definition itself. In defining
violence, an unlimited number of issues must be an-
swered, including: whether the definition includes all
violence or just "gratuitous" violence (violence that is
not essential to the development of a plot or charac-
ter); physical actions or verbal and psychological
abuse; and violence in animated cartoons, or should
the definition only extend to acts committed by living
beings. Other issues that must be addressed include:
whether the definition of violence incorporates come-
dic violence such as slapstick; violent depictions in
nature films, such as a cheetah chasing, catching and
devouring a gazelle; and physical sporting events,
such as boxing, kick-boxing, football and hockey, or
quasi-sporting events, such as professional wrestling.
There is little consensus as to exactly what consti-
tutes violence. Definitions used in academic studies
generally involve the use or threat of physical force
against a person. Some definitions include psycholog-
ical harm, as well. The Center for Media and Public
Affairs recently conducted a study' 1 defining violence
as "deliberate acts of physical force by people against
people or property."'" The definition of violence,
also has been defined to include discussions about vi-
olent acts."
3' Jenny Hontz, Lawmakers Pushing New Violence Bill,
ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Sept. 12, 1994, at 1.
40 Two other bills also addressed the violence issue. One bill
requires television stations and cable operators to maintain, for
one year, copies of commercials and program promotions about
which they have received complaints due to violent program-
ming. S. 1556, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The other bill es-
tablishes a presidential commission to study television violence
and to issue a report within one year. H.R. 2609, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993).
41 See Prettyman and Hook, supra note 9, at 330 n.55.
42 See Ellen Edwards, How the Study Was Conducted,
WASH. POST, Aug. 5, 1994, at C4 (citing Center for Media and
Public Affairs, TV Violence - 1992 vs. 1994, Aug. 8, 1994). The
Center monitored six Washington stations and four cable net-
works over an 18 hour period. The study counted a total of
2,605 scenes of violence, of which 1,411 were defined as contain-
Congress also is unable to pin down the types of
activities it would have the FCC regulate. For exam-
ple, during a Congressional hearing on television vi-
olence in October of 1993, Senator Ernest Hollings
chided CBS for airing a segment of the situation
comedy "Love & War" featuring a satirical barroom
brawl."' Senator Hollings said the scene was an ex-
ample of the excessive violence plaguing television."
Senator Conrad Burns, on the other hand, saw abso-
lutely nothing wrong with the scene. 6
Moreover, most proposed television violence legis-
lation fails to define the very activity it seeks to regu-
late. Only two of the proposals discussed above pro-
vide the FCC with guidance in defining violence.
Senate Bill 943 and House Bill 2837 define violence
as:
any action that has as an element the use or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or
against one's self, with intent to cause bodily harm to such
person or one's self. For purposes of this Act, an action
may involve violence regardless of whether or not such ac-
tion or threat of action occurs in a realistic or serious con-
text or in a humorous or cartoon type context.
47
Similarly, the House and Senate resolutions define
violence as the use or threat of physical force against
another person or one's self.48 Exceptions, however,
are made for "idle threats, verbal abuse, and gestures
without credible violent consequences."' 9 Both reso-
lutions define "dramatized violence" as " the drama-
tized portrayal of killings, rapes, maiming, beatings.
. or any other acts of violence that When viewed by
the average person, would be considered excessive or
inappropriate for minors." 0 In defining violence, the
bulk of legislators share the view of Senator Simon,
who has stated, "I'm not the person to define it, but
there are people who can.""5 As is often the case,
Congress likely will defer the issue to the "expert
ing "serious violence." Id.
48 Graham, What Is Violent? Definitions Defy Logic, USA
TODAY, Feb. 17, 1994, at D3.
"' See One Man's Brawl Is Another's Farce, BROADCAST-
ING & CABLE, Oct. 25, 1993, at 14.
46 Id.
46 Id.
17 S. 943, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1993); H.R. 2837, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1993).
48 See S. Res. 122, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993); H.R.
Res. 202, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1993).
49 See supra note 48.
60 S. Res. 122, supra note 48 at 3-4; H.R. Res. 202, supra
note 48 at 3-4.
"' Senator Simon's Message, BROADCASTING & CABLE,




A. The FCC's Role in Defining Violence
The Commission also faces similar obstacles in de-
fining violence. First, under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA"), 2 courts grant less deference to
administrative agency decisions than to Congress in
enacting laws. However, where Congress does not
provide a specific definition, an agency regulation
will generally withstand scrutiny if it is "a reasona-
ble choice within a gap left open by Congress,"
where the agency has compiled an adequate record
on the issue and the decision is supported, or at least
supportable, by the record." Where an agency
chooses among several options, courts refrain from
substituting their judgment for the agency's, unless
the agency's decision is not supported by the
record.54
Developing and implementing a violence regula-
tion likely will be an extraordinarily complex and
time-consuming task for the FCC. The agency likely
will receive voluminous comments from numerous
parties on all sides of the issue. Many, if not all of
the definitions discussed above likely will be recom-
mended by commenting parties. Most of the congres-
sional initiatives discussed above give the FCC only
six months in which to develop regulations. If Con-
gress decides to force the FCC into regulating televi-
sion violence, the time constraints must be relaxed.
82 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-576 (1988).
See Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (upholding an Environmental
Protection Agency interpretation of the term "stationary source"
under the Clean Air Act, although Congress had already defined
the term).
84 See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519 (1978) (ruling that
the appellate court should review whether the Nuclear Regula-
tory Commission's decision is supportable by the administrative
record "and not stray beyond the judicial province to explore the
procedural format or to impose upon the agency its own notion
of which procedures are 'best' or most likely to further some
vague, undefined public good").
88 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1988).
86 An analogy can be drawn between the dilemma in defin-
ing "violence" on television and the problem with the violence-
related pornography ordinance struck down in American Book-
sellers Association v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985),
afl'd, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). The City of Indianapolis had de-
fined pornography as the graphic sexually explicit subordination
of women, whether in pictures or in words, that also includes
one or more of the following:
(1) women are presented as sexual objects who enjoy pain
B. First Amendment Constraints on the FCC
In regulating television violence, the FCC also
must contend with section 326 of the Communica-
tions Act, which categorically denies the FCC au-
thority to censor broadcast programming and prohib-
its the FCC from issuing any "regulation or
condition" that interferes with broadcasters' right of
free speech. 55 Section 326 generally means that the
Commission's power to regulate broadcasting must
be reconciled with broadcasters' First Amendment
rights. Thus, any FCC-developed definition of vio-
lence must comport with the Constitutional bounda-
ries concerning freedom of speech. 6
The FCC has recognized the difficulties concomi-
tant with government-imposed regulation of violent
content. In the 1975 Report, the Commission noted
the inherent difficulties in defining and regulating
violence:
Regulatory action to limit violent and sexually-oriented
programming which is neither obscene nor indecent is less
desirable than effective self-regulation, since government-
imposed limitations raise sensitive First Amendment
problems. . . . Government rules could create the risk of
improper governmental interference in sensitive, subjective
decisions about programming, could tend to freeze present
standards and could also discourage creative developments
in the medium. 7
Developing a violence definition capable of with-
standing judicial scrutiny will not be an easy task for
the FCC because it is new territory for the agency.
There are few sources to which the Commission
or humiliation; or (2) women are presented as sexual ob-
jects who experience sexual pleasure in being raped; or
(3) women are presented as sexual objects tied up or cut
up or mutilated or bruised or physically hurt, or as dis-
membered or truncated or fragmented or severed into
body parts; or (4) women are presented as being pene-
trated by objects or animals; or (5) women are presented
in scenarios of degradation, injury, abasement, torture,
shown as filthy or inferior, bleeding, bruised, or hurt in a
context that makes these conditions sexual; or (6) women
are presented as sexual objects for domination, conquest,
violation, exploitation, possession, or use, or through pos-
tures or positions of servility or submission or display.
Id. at 324. The purpose of the ordinance was to "alter the so-
cialization of men and women rather than to vindicate commu-
nity standards of offensiveness." Id. at 325. The ordinance was
touted as a means of changing the male view of women as sex
objects, "a tendency that leads to both unacceptable attitudes and
discrimination in the workplace and violence away from it." Id.
The purpose behind most violence legislation is to change soci-
ety's view that violence is acceptable social behavior, and Ameri-
can Booksellers supports this view. See, e.g., S. 1383, supra note
4.
57 1975 FCC Report, supra note 13, at 420.
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could turn. The courts have not yet ad
issue of regulating violence on television,
is no judicial precedent upon which th
rely. The Commission could choose to a
the definitions considered by Congress, b
any such definitions could pass Constituti
will be problematic, at best.
III. REGULATING VIOLENCE
AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS
Violence in television programming is
speech. Although violence itself is beh
often used in the context of conveying a
developing a character or making a socia
political statement. A ban on all viol
sweep with too broad a brush.18 Regulat
will deeply embroil the FCC in the mora
ining each program's content, a path th
avoided since the mid-1980s.59 The FCC
be concerned with "gratuitous" violence,
lence that could be construed as added
gram merely for the shock value or as an
for viewers to watch the program. How
mining what is "gratuitous" violence
mously difficult task. Just as one persor
another's poison, what may be "gratuit
person may be viewed by another as an i
of the plot line or the development of a
dressed the
thus, there
A. The Indecency Standard
e FCC can Some advocates of violence legislation believe vio-
dopt one of lence can be regulated in a similar manner as inde-
iut whether cency.60 Regulating the violent content of program-
onal muster ming, however, may not be as simple as some have
surmised. Nearly twenty years ago, the Commission
addressed the subjects of violence and indecency in
- FIRST the same proceeding. 6 At that time, the FCC de-
cided it could regulate indecency, but when it came
to regulating violence, the Commission deferred to
a form of industry self-regulation stating that "the adoption of
avior, it is rules might involve the government too deeply in
story line, programming content, raising serious constitutional
1, moral, or questions, and judgments concerning the suitability
ence would of particular types of programs for children are
ing violence highly subjective. 2
.ss of exam- In the realm of broadcasting, indecency was ini-
e FCC has tially defined as "language that describes, in terms
likely will patently offensive as measured by contemporary
that is, vio- community standards for the broadcast medium, sex-
to the pro- ual or excretory activities and organs at times of the
enticement day when there is a reasonable risk that children
ever, deter- may be in the audience. '63 Initially, however, FCC
s an enor- enforcement against indecency was limited to the re-
i's nectar is peated use of any of the seven "filthy words" used by
ous" to one George Carlin in a monologue that was broadcast
ntegral part over the radio during the afternoon hours.64 In FCC
character. v. Pacifica Foundation,"6 the Supreme Court found
the "filthy words" to be "patently" offensive, and
thereby held the Commission's enforcement against
the use of these seven words constitutional. 6
58 A 24-hour ban on indecency was held unconstitutional in
Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C.
Cir. 1991).
'9 In 1983, for example, the FCC eliminated regulations
dealing with such areas as alcoholic beverage advertising, repeti-
tious broadcasts of musical recordings, call-in polls on radio and
television stations, the use of sirens in commercials, broadcasts of
astrology material, and the presentation of off-network programs
and feature films. See In re Elimination of Unnecessary Broad-
cast Regulation, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 54 R.R.2d
(P&F) 1043 (1983). The FCC deleted restrictions on the use of
horse race information in 1984. See In re Elimination of Unnec-
essary Broadcast Regulation, Report and Order, 56 R.R.2d
(P&F) 976 (1984).
00 See McAvoy and Coe, TV Rocked by Reno Ultimatum,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 25, 1993, at 6, 14.
81 See 1975 FCC Report, supra note 13. This proceeding
concerned the "family viewing policy." See supra note 17 and
accompanying text.
62 1975 FCC Report, supra note 13, at 419. Then Chair-
man Richard Wiley noted the problems inherent in government
regulation of violent programming:
Short of an absolute ban on all forms of "violence" -
including even slapstick comedy - the question of what is
appropriate for family viewing necessarily must be judged
in highly subjective terms. Under a rigid objective test, I
suppose that it would be argued that many traditional
children's films should be banned because they include
some element of violence - for example, episodes in Peter
Pan when Captain Hook is eaten by a crocodile or in
Snow White where the young heroine is poisoned by the
witch. Such an extreme result simply does not make sense
and would not be acceptable to the American people. In-
deed, the lack of an acceptable objective standard is one of
the best reasons why - the Constitution aside - I feel
that self-regulation is to be preferred over the adoption of
inflexible governmental rules.
Id. at n.5 (citing a Feb. 10, 1975, speech to the National Associ-
ation of Television Program Executives in Atlanta, Georgia)(on
file with CommLaw Conspectus).
8 In re Citizens Complaint Against Pacifica Foundation
Station WBAI, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 56 F.C.C.2d
94, para. 11 (1975).
64 Id.
08 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
I0 d. at 747-50.
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1. Channeling Indecency: A Play in Three ACTs
In regulating indecency in broadcasting, the FCC
developed a "nuisance" theory.6" The Commission
likened the patently offensive nature of indecent lan-
guage to a nuisance, which need not be prohibited,
only channeled. 8 "The law of nuisance does not say,
for example, that no one shall maintain a pigsty; it
simply says that no one shall maintain a pigsty in an
inappropriate place, such as a residential neighbor-
hood.""9 The Commission determined that the "pig-
sty" of indecency should be channeled to those times
when children are not likely to be in the audience.
70
The Commission, however, had problems justifying
a narrow channeling of indecent programming. Up
until 1987, the Commission had allowed the airing
of programs containing indecent language between
the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 6:00 a.m., thus creating
a so-called "safe harbor" for indecent program-
ming." In 1987, the Commission narrowed the safe
harbor period to midnight to 6:00 a.m., and broad-
ened its enforcement to include all material encom-
passed by the indecency definition.
72
This narrowing of the safe harbor was struck
down in 1988, in Action for Children's Television v.
FCC ("ACT T), 73 on the grounds that it was arbi-
trary and capricious. The court reasoned that chan-
neling hours is a content-based regulation of speech
that can be sustained only if the government can
show that the regulation is narrowly tailored to ad-
vance the government's compelling interest .
7  Al-
though the court found that the protection of chil-
dren is a compelling interest, the court lacked the
evidence it needed to justify the ban. Later that year,
Congress directed the FCC to enforce a twenty-four
hour ban on indecency as part of the Commission's
reauthorization legislation." After an FCC rulemak-
ing proceeding executing Congress's mandate, the
Commission found that there is a reasonable risk
07 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 63, para.
11.
08 Channeling is the practice of ensuring that programming
that is inappropriate for children is aired only during hours
when children are less likely to be in the audience.
0 Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 63, para.
11.
70 Id.
71 See In re Infinity Broadcasting Corp. of Pennsylvania,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 3 FCC Rcd. 930 (1987).
72 Id. at para. 27 n.47.
73 852 F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
"' Id. at 1343.
75 Pub. L. No. 100-459, § 608, 102 Stat. 2228 (1988).
76 See In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast
Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 5297, para
that children are in the audience at all hours. 7' In
Action for Children's Television v. FCC ("ACT
III),77 the Court overturned the twenty-four hour
ban.7 8 The ACT II court interpreted ACT I as al-
lowing a safe harbor for indecent programming;
however, a mandate by Congress did not justify a
total ban on indecent programming, nor could it
withstand constitutional scrutiny.79 The case was
again remanded to the FCC to address, among other
things, what constitutes a "reasonable risk" that
children might be in the audience.80
Congress, however, intervened once again. In the
Public Telecommunications Act of 1992, Congress
directed the FCC to establish a midnight to 6:00
a.m. safe harbor for indecency.8" Noncommercial
stations that sign off by midnight would have a safe
harbor beginning at 10:00 p.m. Again, in Action For
Children's Televesion v. FCC ("ACT IIT') the FCC
conducted a rulemaking and the new rules were va-
cated again by the court.82 Among its arguments, the
court opined that the FCC's ban impeded on the
First Amendment rights of adults who were in the
audience during those hours. The court again con-
cluded that the FCC had not tailored its 6:00 a.m. to
midnight ban on constitutionally protected speech
narrowly enough so as to pass Constitutional
muster.83
2. Channeling Violence - First Amendment
Implications
Constitutionally permitted channeling of program-
ming containing violence might not be possible. Un-
like indecency, violence cannot categorically be con-
sidered "patently offensive." As discussed above,
most studies have not faulted violence per se, but
rather, the amount and types of violence. That is
why "excessive" and "gratuitous" violence are most
38 (1990).
71 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1281 (1992).
78 Id. at 1509.
79 Id.
80 Id.
"' Pub. L. No. 102-356, 106 Stat. 949 (1992).
82 11 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and reh'g en banc
granted, 15 F.3d 186 (D.C. Cir. 1994). The ACT III court
stayed the Commission's latest safe harbor rules pending appeal,
but recognized that the Commission may enforce its indecency
rules only on programming that airs between 6:00 a.m. and 8:00
p.m. See Sagittarius Broadcasting Corp., 8 FCC Rcd. 3600,
para. 3 n.5 (1993).
83 ACT III, 11 F.3d at 183.
[Vol. 3
TELEVISION VIOLENCE REGULATION
often the subject of regulatory -efforts. Channeling
"excessive" violence alone necessitates a quantifica-
tion standard, which in turn suggests a standard that
ignores context. Channeling "gratuitous" violence
alone could allow unlimited violence to be shown at
times when children are present so long as it is nec-
essary to the plot or character development. A stan-
dard that channels violent programming based on
both the excessiveness and gratuitousness of the vio-
lence could either cut too narrow, and thus be inef-
fective, or sweep too broadly, stifling speech and
creativity.
The court in the ACT cases applied a strict scru-
tiny analysis to indecency regulation.84 Under this
standard, the government generally must show it is
using the least restrictive means possible to further a
compelling state interest. The same level of scrutiny
would likely be applied to an FCC violence regula-
tion, because violence would likely have greater con-
stitutional protection than indecency.85 Thus, any
FCC violence regulation would be required to fur-
ther a compelling state interest in the least restrictive
means possible.
Obviously, the government has a compelling inter-
est in abating violent behavior in society and in pro-
" See ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509; ACT 1, 832 F.2d at 1342.
8 The government could argue that it is regulating the ef-
fects of television violence, and not violence itself. Such a vio-
lence regulation arguably could then be examined under the in-
termediate scrutiny test of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968). The O'Brien standard requires the government to
show that the regulation in question is within the Constitutional
power of the government, is advancing a substantial state inter-
est, the government interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free speech, and the incidental restriction on speech is no greater
than essential to further the interest. Id. at 377. However, in
order for this argument to succeed, a direct causal link must be
established between the increase in real life violence (or even vi-
olent crime) and violence on television. See City of Renton v.
Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (upholding a regulation
limiting the location of adult theaters in the city as a means of
curbing the "secondary effects" such theaters have on the
community).
11 Several recent incidents have drawn considerable media
attention. A fatal fire set by a child was blamed on the alleged
influence of an episode of the cable cartoon, "Beavis and Butt-
head." See Can TV Violence Be Curbed?, NEWSWEEk, Nov. 1,
1993, at 96-97. Two teenagers were killed while lying on the
center line of a busy highway. The movie, "The Program," con-
tained a similar scene that producers deleted from the film sub-
sequent to the incident. Id. A woman in France filed suit after
her son was killed while making a homemade bomb, which he
allegedly learned to make from watching an episode of the
American television series, "MacGyver." See Marlise Simons,
Blaming TV for Son's Death, Frenchwoman Sues, N.Y. TIMES,
tecting children. Violent crime among youths is con-
tinuously increasing. However, as yet, there is no
conclusive evidence definitively linking violence on
television to real life violent crimes. Instead, the root
causes seem to be elements of an individual's envi-
ronment: poverty, lack of education, the absence of
strong parental guidance, and the violence surround-
ing drug and gang wars. Although the media has
been cited for influencing isolated incidents of what
can be described as foolish behavior,8 6 there is no
proof that violent behavior generally can be attrib-
uted to violent depictions on television.
In fact, courts have refused to accept a causal link
between televised programming and real-life antiso-
cial behavior. For example, in Zamora v. CBS,a7 the
plaintiff, a fifteen year-old who had been convicted
of killing his neighbor, contended that he had "be-
come involuntarily addicted to and completely subli-
minally intoxicated by the extensive viewing of tele-
vision violence" contained in programming aired by
three broadcasting companies.88 The Zamora court,
however, rejected the plaintiff's argument, noting the
First Amendment problems inherent in imposing
civil liability on broadcasters who air violent
programming.8 9
Aug. 30, 1993, at A5.
Prettyman and Hook, supra note 9, at 331-32 n.55, note sev-
eral cases of violent criminal behavior that were imitative of
news reports concerning violent incidents. For example, after a
1982 incident where Tylenol laced with cyanide killed seven
people, over 300 "copycat" cases of drug tampering occurred
within weeks. Id. In addition, a twelve-year-old boy sexually as-
saulted a girl on a pool table, apparently after hearing news cov-
erage about a similar incident. Id. However, none of the inci-
dents were actually broadcast - they were merely reported
during newscasts. One violent incident, however, that may be
attributable to television, involved the television movie, "The
Burning Bed," a dramatization of the true story of a woman
who doused her husband's bed with gasoline and set it afire
while he slept. Later, a man who had watched the program al-
legedly set fire to his estranged wife while she was in bed. Id.
The argument can be made, of course, that millions of people
who viewed the program did not torch their spouses.
" 480 F. Supp. 199 (S.D. Fla. 1979).
, Id. at 200.
I d. The court stated:
ITihe plaintiffs here seek, in fact, some kind of pervasive
judicial restriction upon the three defendants incident to a
determination of the violation of a heretofore undefined
duty.... The point here, of course, is that improper judi-
cial limitation of first amendment rights is as offensive as
unwarranted legislative incursion into that area.




B. Viewing Only That Which is Fit for Children
The state interest must be limited to the protection
of children in a sufficiently narrow fashion so as to
avoid infringing the rights of adults to view violent
programming. This view is embodied in cases dating
back to Butler v. Michigan." Butler was charged
with violating a state obscenity law by selling a book
described as "containing obscene, immoral, lewd, las-
civious language, or descriptions, tending to incite
minors to violent or depraved or immoral acts, mani-
festly tending to the corruption of the morals of
youth.""' In overturning the conviction, Justice
Frankfurter noted that "[w]e have before us legisla-
tion not reasonably restricted to the evil with which
it is said to deal. The incidence of this enactment is
to reduce the adult population of Michigan to read-
ing only what is fit for children." 92 The Court found
that the statute in question infringed upon the First
Amendment rights of adults.9"
The ACT cases carry the same message for FCC
channeling of indecency. In ACT I, the circuit court
found that "in view of the curtailment of broadcaster
freedom and adult listener choice that channeling en-
tails, the Commission failed to consider fairly and
fully what time lines should be drawn. '94 The ACT
II court alluded to the same principle, citing an ear-
lier FCC finding that the Commission could not in-
terfere with adults' access to indecent program-
ming.95 Moreover, the court in ACT III suggested
that the Commission find a time when adults are in
the audience and the risk that children are in the
audience is low.9 6 Such a view is easily transferable
to depictions of violence. Adults who wish to view
violent programming should be able to do so.
9 352 U.S. 380 (1957) (addressing the issue of a state's
right to ban obscene material from the whole population where
the material was found to be obscene only to children).
91 Id. at 381.
92 Id. at 383.
93 Id. at 384.
94 ACT I, 852 F.2d at 1341.
11 ACT II, 932 F.2d at 1509.
9 Id.
"' See Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488.
98 See Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445
(1994) (vacating lower court which affirmed "must carry" provi-
sions of the Cable Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992, and remanding to District Court for a more complete
record).
" See Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)(ruling that the Fairness Doctrine, which required broad-
casters to air diverse viewpoints, was not a violation of broad-
casters' First Amendment rights due to the scarcity of the elec-
tromagnetic spectrum); see also Turner, 114 S.Ct at 4651-52.
IV. CABLE VS. BROADCAST: RECON-
CILING FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
The heightened First Amendment rights of cable
programmers presents another obstacle to a workable
violence regulation. Cable operators have been
granted a higher First Amendment status than
broadcasters.9" While the monopoly status of cable
operators has been justified as a means of regulating
their business practices,98 the courts have rejected a
scarcity rationale, which has shackled broadcasters
with content regulations for a quarter of a century."
Except for commercial speech restrictions,' fed-
eral content regulations do not apply to cable pro-
gramming. The FCC has recognized that indecency
may be shown on cable and other non-broadcast dis-
tribution systems.10' In addition, the FCC has re-
fused to impose other content-based regulations on
cable, such as requiring cable system operators to
provide access to their channels by candidates for
federal office."0
Unless a violence regulation addresses the cable is-
sue, it will be ineffective. Many cable and satellite-
delivered services, such as HBO and Showtime, pro-
vide unedited movies. Many of the programs offered
are action-adventure and horror movies which con-
tain much violence, often far more than the pro-
gramming contained on broadcast stations.10 While
most of the programs contain warnings, some of the
regulatory efforts have been spurred by the view that
warnings are ineffective.' 4 Thus, violence regulation
applicable only to broadcasters does little to alleviate
the perceived problem.
The so-called "nuisance" theory used to justify
regulating broadcast speech is not as compelling for
100 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1304-1307 (restricting lottery ad-
vertising); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340, 4402 (prohibiting advertis-
ing of certain tobacco products); Children's Television Act of
1990, Pub. L. No. 101-437, 104 Stat. 996 (1990)(codified at 47
U.S.C. § 303a)(Supp. IV 1992)(restricting the amount of adver-
tising contained in children's programming).
101 See In re Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broadcast
Indecency in 18 U.S.C. § 1464, Report, 5 FCC Rcd. 5297,
para. 84 (1990).
o' In re Codification of the Commission's Political Pro-
gramming Policies, Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 678, para. 6
n.11 (1991).
108 It is surprising, then, that a bill which is designed to pro-
hibit violent video programming during the hours when children
may be in the audience should exempt premium and pay-per-
view cable programming from its regulation. See S. 1383, supra
note 24.
104 See S. 1811, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994); S. 1383, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
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cable regulation.'"8 Unlike broadcasting, cable is not
pervasive in the home. It must be "invited" into the
home, through subscription to the service. In addi-
tion, with the variety of packaging arrangements,
called "tiers," offered by cable operators, parents
may have greater control over the programs that
come into the home. Unwanted programming choices
may be less of a problem in a cable environment.
Still, the problem persists. Although most cable pro-
grammers target specific audiences, some resemble
the broadcast networks by offering a variety of pro-
grams, often interspersing "family" programs with
action-adventure programs. Thus, unsupervised chil-
dren still can partake of much of the violent fare car-
ried by cable. 108
Congress and the FCC have, in the past, applied
some commercial content restrictions to cable in or-
der to effectuate the purpose of the law. Certain to-
bacco advertising is banned on all electronic me-
dia. 10 7 By the same token, the advertising restrictions
of the Children's Television Act were imposed on
cable programmers.'0 8 The FCC also has restricted
casino and certain lottery advertising on local origi-
nation cable programming. 109 All these restrictions
deal with the commercial aspects of speech by cable
operators and programmers. Violence regulation re-
stricts the creative speech rights of cable and satellite
programmers. Whether the state could infringe upon
those rights merely as a means to effectuate a statute,
the purpose of which is to improve the well-being of
unsupervised children, is argumentative at best.
109 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, supra note 63,
para. 29.
106 The situation may be exacerbated with the advent of
common carrier delivery of video programming via "video di-
altone" systems. See In re Telephone Company-Cable Cross-
Ownership Rules, Second Report and Order, Second Notice. of
Proposed Rule making, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781 (1992). In a video
dialtone world, viewers might have access to 500 or more chan-
nels of video programming and other services. Some services may
be provided on a subscription basis, while others could be ac-
cessed as pay-per-view programming. Because the common car-
rier providing the access facilities would be prohibited from al-
tering the content of the signal, children may have access to
many services that may be inappropriate for them. Moreover,
V. CONCLUSION
Government regulation of televised violence is not
an easy proposition. Violence is a recognized form of
speech that has Constitutional protection. The gov-
ernment, therefore, must clearly define what it pro-
poses to regulate, and regulate it as narrowly as pos-
sible in order to achieve its objectives. The
government must give due consideration to the First
Amendment rights of programmers to speak and
adults to receive the programs.
The final resolution of a government-imposed vio-
lence standard is probably years away. Litigation
over FCC and Congressional attempts to make the
indecency standard more stringent is now in its third
incarnation in the courts. To date, the process has
taken more than six years, and it has yet to reach the
Supreme Court. Because the governmental basis for
regulating violent programming is much less distinct
than for indecency, a similar - or longer - court
battle could result.
The best solution seems to be self-regulation. The
government may be limited to requiring that broad-
casters provide warnings before programs the broad-
casters consider to be inappropriate for children. De-
spite their early balkiness, the broadcast and cable
industries now respond to government and public
pressure. Both have established monitoring and noti-
fication procedures.1 0 Although these efforts may
not fully address the concerns about unsupervised
children, they should aid those charged with the care
of children by ensuring that appropriate program-
ming is being viewed. Industry self-regulation is not
perfect, but it offers the quickest, least restrictive
means of dealing with the situation.
the indecency analogy to violence regulation would be less per-
suasive, since the Supreme Court has ruled that indecent lan-
guage may be transmitted over common carriers. See Sable
Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115
(1989) (allowing indecent telephone services to use common car-
rier facilities).
107 15 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988).
108 47 U.S.C. § 303a(d) (Supp. IV 1992).
109 47 C.F.R. § 76.213 (1993).
" See TV Violence to Be Monitored and Reported, N.Y.
TIMES, June 30, 1994, at C20; Cable Industry Picks a Non-
profit Company to Study TV Violence, WALL ST. J., May 19,
1994, at B7.
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